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## The Intensification of the Cold War and Its Impact on the Chinese- Indonesian Policy 1955-1958

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### Conclusion

The roots of the Sino-Indonesia relations go back to more than a hundred years ago, before the beginning of the Indonesian independence, but they were mostly characterized by the non-interference of China in Indonesia's internal problems.

The international system after World War II developed greatly and turned into a bipolar system represented by both the United States of America and the Soviet Union, but at the same time other countries were trying to search for a role for themselves in the international system, and most of these countries were China as an influential force on the international arena. Since the declaration of independence in 1949, China has tried to activate its foreign policy with its regional surroundings, especially Indonesia, because of its distinguished position due to the importance of its geostrategic location for China. Therefore, Chinese policy towards Indonesia during the years (1955-1958) was characterized by great convergence, because it was subject to the policy of international and regional tensions.

Through these political actors, the importance of studying (Chinese-Indonesian diplomatic rapprochement 1955-1958) appears, as this study will reflect to us the nature of Chinese diplomatic behavior towards Indonesia, accompanied by the great international competition over Indonesia between the United States of America, the Soviet Union and China.

### Introduction

#### Scope of research and analysis of sources

The year 1949 was the beginning of the independence of China and Indonesia and the start of a new phase in the history of political relations between the two sides. The researcher found a stop at the end of 1954, as this year witnessed a major shift in relations through the signing of the Chinese-Indonesian Treaty in 1955, as well as the Bandung Conference in 1955. through which the relations between the two countries were normalized.

The first topic came (American-Chinese rivalry in Indonesia 1955-1958), which dealt with the issue of global communism in Southeast Asia and China's endeavor to develop specific concepts, as well as China's objection to the Soviet Union's policy in dealing with the United States of America, and focused on the nature of American politics to undermine the role of reputation In Asia .

As for the second topic (the Chinese position on the American support for military rebellions in Indonesia 1956-1958)

It focused on internal revolutions and crises led by some military leaders in the outer islands, with the support of the United States of America, and the collapse of the parliamentary system. Reliable to reduce the influence of the Indonesian Communist Party.

The study relied on a number of sources in the English language, the most important of which are:

- Peter Edman, *Communism a al Aidit: The Indonesian Communist Party Under Din Aidit 1950-1965*, James Cook University of North Queensland, Australlia, 1989.
- Harold C. Hinton and others, *Major Governments of Asia*, Second Edition, Cornell University Press, New York, 1963.
- Ide Anak Agung Gde, *Twenty Years Indonesia Foreign Policy (1945-1965)*, Part II, Mouton, The Hague, 1973.
- Bambang S. Widjanarko, *Sewindu Dekat Bung Karno*, Kepustakaan Populer Gramedia, Jakarta, 2010.

### **The first topic**

#### **US-Chinese Rivalry in Indonesia 1955-1958.**

The divergence of Chinese Soviet policies in Asia had a significant impact in undermining the position of the People's China in competition with the United States of America in East Asia, especially since the dispute between China and the Soviet Union began at the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, when Khrushchev denounced (Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev) (1), Stalin (Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin) (2) and made proposals to deal with the United States, but Beijing could not accept them, as the Soviet Union deliberately underestimated the importance of the Bandung Conference, especially after the People's Government of China stressed the need to focus the communist bloc on the Afro-Asian countries in order to exploit their differences with the powers colonial (3).

It was already clear from the Soviet participation in the Big Four talks at the Geneva Conference in July 1955 regarding Berlin and disarmament, that Moscow's primary interest is still focused on the Atlantic theater, and therefore it does not welcome China's preventive moves to redirect the efforts of the socialist camp elsewhere, within That the Soviet Union was interested in easing tensions in the Far East with the United States of America (4), and this was revealed in October 1956 after the Soviet Union re-established diplomatic relations with Japan (5).

Despite the continuation of talks between China and the United States of America, through the efforts aimed at easing tensions in the Taiwan Strait region, which both sides initiated in 1955 (6), and their pursuit of a policy of reducing tensions in East Asia, Washington did not agree to remove its military presence. Beijing was not ready to recognize the status quo created by the United States of America, as well as its cooperation with the Chinese nationalist regime led by Chiang Kai-shek in Taiwan, while the talks were underway. To rearm Japan and develop Okinawa into the most powerful military base that includes air, sea and nuclear weapons in the Pacific (7).

The peaceful ish is in full swing, but to no avail, despite the restriction of Beijing's foreign policy in Indonesia, the Chinese government has realized that the United States of America does not want to ease tension in Northeast Asia, and Beijing has also confirmed that the results of the Bandung Conference are the basis for dealing in politics The Chinese Foreign Ministry towards the United States of America (8 ), in the midst of these events, Zhou Enlai offered to hold talks with Washington instead of trying to organize a broad united front against the American expansionist endeavors in the Far East ( 9), despite all the Chinese concessions, the US administration did not respond to the implementation of the policy of coexistence peaceful, especially after the United States of America sought to form and support political-military regimes directed against China (10).

At a time when China was seeking to limit the policy of the United States of America and its allies in the Far East, it was surprised by the Soviet position, which was undermined by the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance with China concluded in 1950, in which the two sides pledged to refuse to normalize relations with Tokyo (both rejected the Japanese peace treaty of 1951 ) (11 ), pending Japan's withdrawal from its military alliance with the United States, severing relations with nationalist China and recognizing the People's China (12 ).

The main political effect of the Soviet Union's resumption of relations with Japan was to encourage the conservative circles in Japan and Indonesia to approach the United States of America and its allies (13). Afro-Asians, especially Indonesia, and that these forces may tend to redraw a new policy that fulfills the conclusion of military pacts between Asian countries and the United States (14), and it is certain that this was not the message that Beijing tried to convey through its constant policy of firm and unified opposition Given the disregard for Moscow's apparent anti-colonial line in Asia, the Chinese now had to reassess the implications of the diplomatic and economic campaigns undertaken by the Soviets after 1956 in India and Europe. (15 ).

The Geneva conference held in 1955 resulted in some political and military arrangements, but they were quickly undermined by the United States of America in Southeast Asia, as the Indochina settlement was canceled in 1954, and the first result of this decision was the signing of the Southeast Asia Treaty (SEATO). , which was established under a security treaty in September 1954 dealing with Laos and Cambodia, where this treaty included in one of its clauses a paragraph allowing the signatory countries to request military assistance or direct intervention by the United States of America in the event that one of these countries was exposed to external aggression or a threat to its political system , despite the clear language of the Geneva Conventions, which explicitly called for the neutralization of these two states (16).

With the withdrawal of the French from South Vietnam, the United States pledged to establish a regime in Saigon under Ngo Dinh Diem; The goal was the permanent division of Vietnam into two countries, the first supported by the United States of America and the second communist along the lines of the Korean division. Once again, the US administration worked in violation of the Geneva Convention of 1954, and according to the SEATO Treaty, Thailand and the Philippines will be the two wings that support the main American fortress that was established in South Vietnam (17).

By 1956, Washington drew up a new policy of intervention in Indonesia, Laos, and Cambodia through secret diplomacy and intervention, and then expansion to other countries in the Far East aimed at strengthening the remaining weak links in the chain that the United States was formulating to surround communist China, and on a related level the United States made The United States of America and the Soviet Union made great efforts to achieve common goals, the first of which was deterring Chinese expansion in Indonesia and the region and creating a force countering the international balance in the Far East region, especially after the Indonesian-Chinese rapprochement in the Bandung Conference. In addition, the Soviet Union and the United States of America strengthened their support for India As a counterweight to China in Asia (18).

In the year (1957-1958) the United States of America carried out right-wing military coups in Burma, Pakistan, Laos and Thailand, and began to support and approach the army to make it the decisive and dominant word and political influence in Indonesia and create a gap between it and the Indonesian Communist Party (19).

China called on the socialist camp to take a hard line against the United States of America in 1957 against the background of the proposals made by the Soviet leader Khrushchev, as China expressed concern about the possible effects of these proposals, and this call did not reflect China's concern about its national interests at risk, but also reflected Also, its lack of confidence in the global goals of the Soviet leadership and its far-reaching intentions to respect the Chinese Communist Party (20).

China was disturbed by the principles of foreign policy announced by Khrushchev at the Chinese Communist Party conference, especially after China's failure to deter the policy of the United States of America in Asia (21), as the Soviets interpreted that peaceful coexistence essentially means nuclear coexistence with the United States, and therefore that the Soviet Union was ready To accept not only the status quo imposed by the United States in Asia but also American actions aimed at rolling back communism and neutrality, Moscow also saw that the pursuit of an active anti-Western strategy on the part of socialist forces to counter the American offensive strategy in Asia was unacceptable, because it had lead to free In general, instead, Khrushchev said that the expulsion of the colonialists from the colonies and the newly independent countries must be achieved primarily through the strengthening of the socialist camp (22).

Mao Zedong announced during the Ou Conference in 1957 that "the total strength of the socialist forces combined has exceeded the strength of the imperialists, and he made it clear that the strength of the Chinese Communist Party exceeded the forces of the Kuomintang Party, and the Soviet victory over the Axis powers enabled us to change the balance of world power with this victory in favor of the Communist camp." (23).

Mao Zedong emphasized the balance of power, focusing on ideological, political and economic factors, not just military factors. Because of this emphasis on the supremacy of the socialist bloc, China demanded that the Soviets adopt a strategy of military force against the United States, and that Beijing called for revolutionary struggles led by the communist forces in the occupied countries of pre-colonial and newly independent countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America (24), and subsequent Chinese actions and statements proved that Beijing was indeed urging a more stringent strategy to confront the liberal camp, and there was little doubt that the Chinese tried to force the Soviets to adopt a strategy that would focus the efforts of The socialist camp to support the position of the Chinese Communist Party in Asia, and urged the Chinese not to take this struggle in the form of a war initiated by the socialist countries, but rather a firm willingness to oppose the United States of America when it interferes in the internal affairs of the countries of the Far East or their attempt to suppress national liberation movements in the colonial world (25).

Khrushchev seems to have believed that communist strength in the victories achieved by the communist parties through legal parliamentary struggle in industrialized European countries would lead to the advancement of socialism in the West, and that aid should be crucial to national liberation movements in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Through this, it appears what are the priorities of the socialist camp towards its clients. He also made it clear that China and other countries that oppose the colonialists will have to wait until the Soviet Union triumphs over the West after a long-term economic competition in the West. Khrushchev stressed that peaceful coexistence should be The general line of foreign policies of all the Communist Parties really means that Moscow will formulate the strategy that the world movement should follow and that this strategy will be determined by the overriding factor of the Soviet-American nuclear rivalry.

Meanwhile, in 1957, the principle of peaceful coexistence between countries with communist regimes did not contradict Chinese foreign policy, as Beijing advanced peaceful coexistence as the basic principle in its foreign policy, but at the same time it did not agree with Khrushchev's idea that peaceful coexistence should also apply to American colonialism, as well as policies of retreat in front of anti-communist opponents in Asia in general and Indonesia in particular, and the acceptance of Khrushchev's principle of peaceful coexistence means that Beijing was unable to oppose American expansion in Asia, so that the balance of power in the West has swept decisively in favor of the Union Soviet (26).

On the issue of peaceful coexistence, the disagreement with Moscow was mainly over China's insistence that this principle cannot be applied to relations between the oppressed and the oppressors (i.e. to liberation movements struggling for colonialism, including Indonesia), and that doctrine cannot become the general line. For all communist parties, regardless of national conditions or their reaching a stage of conflict with the capitalist system. On the other hand, Beijing did not make any calls for revolution in countries friendly to China, including some capitalist partners of the United States (27).

Beijing temporarily accepted the Soviet definition of peaceful coexistence set out in the Moscow Declaration of 1957 and did so only because that formulation reaffirmed the principles that China had earlier pledged would govern its relations with Asian-African states(28),<sup>3</sup> if in fact the original

commitment of the communist states to coexistence Peaceful questioning in late 1957 was due to Soviet intervention in Hungary and Poland, not to aggressive actions by China (29).

The main external activity carried out by Beijing in (1956-1957) was the use of diplomacy of friendship and negotiation with Indonesia as well as its neutral neighbors, although most of these governments were dominated by military elites who were dominated by extremist and reckless behavior, especially in Indonesia, in order to achieve unity The Chinese, the basic issues that were raised in the year (1956-1957) were presented in a different form than the communist blocs, and this was evident after the Moscow conference.

China tried to change its course in international relations by developing a different approach in foreign policy away from Moscow. In fact, Beijing tried to redirect the international line of the communist forces as it began to approach Indonesia through diplomatic visits, delegations and military support between the two sides. China's policies became clear a year later. 1957 It welcomed engagement with newly independent nations and leaders who actively opposed the United States. Peaceful coexistence with all friendly or neutral nations was still desirable (30), true neutrality would be respected in the Cold War, and there was no call for revolution by Beijing in Indonesia though From the clear rapprochement between the Indonesian military leaders and the United States of America, however, the Beijing government tried to strengthen and encourage all kinds of anti-American struggles by the Indonesian Communist Party, and more focus was placed on strengthening political relations between the two sides, as the two countries are threatened by policies The United States or its opposition (31), and it is no secret that Indonesia was after 1957 a major target of the new Chinese policy, as it is one of the most important goals and international commitments of the socialist camp. During that time, the situation in Indonesia was politically turbulent, and its development soon led to a closer identification of foreign policy interests for both China and Indonesia (32).

### **The second topic**

#### **The Chinese position on the American support for the military rebellions in Indonesia 1956-1958.**

Since the beginning of 1956, Indonesia has suffered a series of revolutions and internal crises, led by some military leaders in the outer islands. The motive behind the usurpation of some military leaders of power was the local opposition to Jakarta's policies towards the outer islands. The revolutions arose from escalating fears among Muslims, the army and conservatives about friendly relations. Which links Ali's government with the Indonesian Communist Party and the People's Government of China, these rebellions showed Jakarta's inability to control them and as a result of their inability to deal with them and eliminate them, Ali's government resigned in March 1957, and this was the end of the bad attempt of the Indonesian government in dealing with the sprawling regions in the country and unite the political forces(33).

In conjunction with that, the collapse of the parliamentary system quickly led to political chaos. President Sukarno tried to control the situation with the support of the army, which declared the authority of martial law in March 1957. The Mashumi party and some parties against Sukarno's policy tried to remove him, but they could not do so because of his acceptability. The elite and the masses(34).

Sukarno was never enthusiastic about the parliamentary system, believing that it was not suitable for Indonesian conditions and characteristics, and then he was not sorry to see the democratic experiment in government fail. That the time has come to bury the political parties as well as the military leaders that were interfering in Indonesian politics through its close relations with the United States of America, which was a matter that aroused Sukarno a lot (35).

The Chinese government began to strengthen its rapprochement with Sukarno in early 1957 through the Indonesian Communist Party being the only party that supported Sukarno's call for a new political system to replace the constitutional democracy that had lost credibility in Indonesia (36), and in its support for Sukarno, the Indonesian Communist Party hoped to Gaining greater influence within his government and in order to be able to seize the reins of supreme power in Indonesia, these expectations aroused the concern of other political parties and circles opposed to Chinese interference in Indonesia. To the Indonesian Communist Party system has become clearly forbidden, and on the other hand, once you lose a lot of profitable spoils for office, the corrupt and poorly organized non-communist parties will be at a very disadvantageous position vis-à-vis the Communist Party(37).

Unlike its competitors, the Indonesian Communist Party was not dependent on the spoils system offered by parliamentary democracy in Indonesia to mobilize political supporters, and so there was a great fear among local and anti-communist circles that the Indonesian Communists would be the main beneficiaries of command democracy unless they could somehow be excluded. While Sukarno was negotiating with other political leaders on how to prevent the party from becoming too powerful in a government governed by a guided democracy, two events occurred that profoundly changed the course of internal political development in Indonesia and Sukarno's attitude toward the great powers. (38 ).

On the thirtieth of November 1957, Sukarno was subjected to an assassination attempt by Muslim fanatics who seemed to be linked to the dissident army officers and leaders of the Mashumi party in the assassination attempt (39), this incident played a decisive role in generating deep suspicion and hostility shown by President Sukarno towards them, as the assassination attempt played The rebellion played an important role in the emergence of Sukarno's decision to seek support from the Indonesian Communist Party for his domestic policies, while he turned to the Soviet Union and China to obtain the assistance he needed to implement an independent foreign policy (40).

In February 1958 dissident military leaders in Sumatra and Sulawesi (Celebes) rebelled against the Indonesian central government (41 ), and on February 15, 1958 a rival government was formed in Sumatra. Concerns of the Indonesian Communist Party and Sukarno's apparent willingness to treat the communists as a bona fide nationalist party, and the army's high command saw that the possibility of intervention by Western capitalist countries constituted a direct threat to the state more than the Indonesian communists (42).

Thus, the Indonesian rebellion not only harmed US policy but also put Beijing in a position to call for the first time active Chinese-Indonesian cooperation in the struggle against US imperialism, and the failure of the rebellion dealt a heavy blow to the anti-Communist Party elements in Indonesia (43).

The United States officially announced that it had taken a neutral position on the Indonesian civil war, but Secretary of State John Foster Dulles (44 ) made it clear from the outset that Washington's

sympathy lay with the rebels (45 ), in early March 1958 the American ambassador to Indonesia was appointed John Allison, a man who was Acting mildly toward Sukarno, he appears to have disagreed with the emerging American plan to covertly assist the insurgency by the United States to oust him Sukarno, on the thirteenth of March 1958, referred to the statement issued by the SEATO Council, which clearly explained the events that took place in Indonesia, and the articulated danger arising from the failure of some non-communist governments to distinguish between the goals and ideals of the free world and the purposes of international communism (46).

China's response to the Indonesian crisis took the form of timely diplomatic and material support for Sukarno, and immediately condemned the SEATO Statement of March 13, 1958 as an attempt by the "Manila bloc" to interfere in Indonesia's internal affairs and in the field of economic cooperation. April 1958, to the Government of Indonesia about sixteen million dollars in credit for rice, textiles, etc. (47).

On May 15, 1958, the statement of the People's Government of China linked the American intervention in Indonesia directly to the main issue of Beijing's policy towards Jakarta and the need to strengthen anti-colonial unity between the two countries. The statement of May 15 drew attention to the United States and its agents, "Chiang Kai-shek." Taiwan used to continue the rebellion in North Sulawesi after the collapse of the rebel outpost in Sumatra, and this activity directed by the United States was aimed at subverting the legitimate Indonesian government and suppressing the movement of the Indonesian people in defense of national independence against colonialism, thus shackle the Indonesian people once again to colonial rule, and moreover That was the broader goal of the United States is to strike a blow at the national independence movements that flourished in Asia and Africa. This action is not only an outright provocation to the Indonesian people, but also a serious challenge to the outputs adopted by the Bandung Conference (48).

Shortly thereafter, the Indonesian military began sending troops to quell the rebels in Sumatra, and units of the United States Seventh Fleet arrived off the coast, standing ready to protect any American citizens and property that might be threatened by the Indonesian civil war(49).

In light of this failure, the United States was forced to withdraw its support for the rebels because it became clear that the intervention undermined the American relations with the army, which is the main political force that Washington decided to support in Indonesia, although the rebellions in Indonesia were not completely over and the withdrawal of American moral and material support soon. What sealed the fate of the resistance, and the United States did not then seriously try to mend relations with Sukarno (50).

In an attempt to emphasize the parallel interests of China and Indonesia, the Chinese leaders made it clear that it is now necessary to stress the seriousness of the situation resulting from the United States' use of Taiwan to intervene in Indonesia, and that the continuation of this development will inevitably result in very serious consequences (51), and the statement pledged to provide more aid and support. In the event that the Indonesian government requested it, it also called for the Asian and African peoples and all countries and peoples to help the Indonesians in their defense of national independence and stand against American interference (52).

It continued to help overtly and covertly the Indonesian military as the main force that could be relied upon to reduce the influence of the Indonesian Communist Party and Sukarno. Thus, the US



intervention in the Indonesian Civil War did not have the therapeutic effect that it could have had. Of course, the failure of the United States to compensate for this. It strengthened Sukarno's suspicions that Washington had not yet abandoned the goal of overthrowing him (53).

It is noteworthy that Sukarno decided, after the refusal of the United States of America, led by President Eisenhower, to sell it arms, to move to the communist camp, and indeed the communist bloc worked to provide support and weapons, which dampened the atmosphere between the communists and the Indonesian army (54).

### Conclusion

In light of the foregoing, it appears clear that the Chinese-Indonesian rapprochement constituted a great success for Chinese policy in Southeast Asia through the Chinese understanding of the Indonesian strategy during the years 1955-1958. The Chinese strategy was not limited to attempts to turn Indonesia into a part of the containment zone and remove it from the orbit of the United States America without trying to understand what is going on in the mind of the Indonesian leaders, so China made unremitting efforts for the Indonesian rapprochement.

By studying China's policy, it becomes clear to us the importance of Chinese foreign policy in influencing Indonesia and its internal and external developments, given that Indonesia represents strategic depth and a vital area for Chinese policy and its regional relations.

A set of conclusions that the researcher came out with through this study can be determined, the most important of which are:

1. The Sino-American rivalry marked its peak during 1955-1958.

2. The United States of America exerted a variety of pressures to prevent the government of the People's Republic of China from establishing relations with Indonesia, and it also took the action of the Indonesian leaders to prevent China from getting closer. Chinese efforts continued to grow.

### Margins

(1 ) Nikita Sergeyeovich Khrushchev (1894-1953): Soviet leader and political leader Nikita Sergeyeovich Khrushchev was born in 1918 in Georgia Yenkita, joined the Soviet Communist Party, became the first secretary of the Moscow Regional Council of the Party (1935-1938), in 1939 a key member of Politburo (1949-1953) and the Communist Party of Ukraine (1938-1947), took over the leadership of the Communist Party after the death of Stalin, then became prime minister in 1958 in addition to his post. He is the first to combine the presidency of both the party and the government. For more, see: Hindi Anis Mikhael, Khrushchev and the features of the political and economic system in the Soviet Union, *The Egyptian Journal of Political Science*, No. 46, Volume 12, Cairo, January, 1965, pp. 95-120; Mulvin Group, *Fire and Ice, The Red Empire from Cradle to Grave*, 1st Edition, Dar Al-Hussam for Printing, Publishing and Distribution, Beirut, 1922, pp. 79-83.

(2 ) Joseph Stalin (1879-1953): A Soviet military and political leader, Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin was born in the Georgian city of Gori on December 18, 1879. He studied at the Russian Orthodox Christian School, but did not complete his studies because the school expelled him for being absent. He was passionate about banned novels and books. Revolutionary, including Marxist, Stalin studied Marx's

communist theories, which agreed with his tendencies for revolution and rebellion against the system of society. Marx and Lenin formulated his visions and directions, so he embraced the theories they put forward. At the beginning of his life, he worked as a writer at the Meteorological Center in Tbilisi. For more, see Muhammad Helmy and others, *The Socialist Encyclopedia*, Dar Al-Kutub Press, Beirut, ed., pg. 220.

(<sup>3</sup>) Peter Edman , *Communism a al Aidit: The Indonesian Communist Party Under Dn Aidit 1950-1965* , James Cook University of North Queensland , Australlia , 1989 , P.138. .

(<sup>4</sup>). Richard P. Stebbins and Others, *The United States in World Affairs 1954*, New Guinea, Cuprous and Africa, New York, 1956, PP.298-305

(5) Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, *The Possible Dream*, Copyright by Howard Palfrey Jones, 1<sup>st</sup> ed, new York, 1971, P. 111-116; C.L.M. Penders, *The West New Guinea Debacle: Dutch Decolonisation and Indonesia, 1945- 1962*, Crawford House Publishing, Adelaide, 2002, P.30.

(<sup>6</sup>). Roger M. Smith, *South East Asia Documents of Political Develop Mend and Change*, Cornell University, 1974, p.17.

(<sup>7</sup>) Kenneth J. Conboy , *Intel : Inside Indonesia Indonesia's Intelligence Service* , Equinox Publishing , Jakarta ,2004 , Pp. 41-42.

(<sup>8</sup>) Harold C. Hinton and others, *Major Governments of Asia*, Second Edition, Cornell University Press, New York, 1963, pp599-605.

(<sup>9</sup>) Ide Anak Agung Gde, *Twenty Years Indonesia Foreign Policy (1945-1965)*, Part II, Mouton, The Hague, 1973, PP.248-255.

(<sup>10</sup>) Bambang S. Widjanarko , *Sewindu Dekat Bung Karno* , Kepustakaan Populer Gramedia , Jakarta , 2010 , P.153.

(<sup>11</sup>) Robert Cribb, Audrey Kahin, *Historical Dictionaries of Asia, Oceania, and the Middle East*, No.51, the Scarecrow press, Inc. Lonham, Marylan, Toronto, Oxford, 2004, pp.207-218.

(<sup>12</sup>) George MCT. Kanin, *Politics and International Relations of South East Asia*, University of Malaya in Malaysia , 1977, pp42-48.

(<sup>13</sup>) M. C. Recklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia Since 1200*, Third Edition, Great Britain, 2001, p. 316..

(<sup>14</sup>) Robert Cribb, op. cit., p.225

(<sup>15</sup>) J. R. E. Waddell, *An Introduction to South East Asia Politics*, Australlsia, 1972, P.234; S. Takdir Alisjahbana, *Indonesia; Social and Cultural Revolution*, Singapore, 1966, P., P.189.

(<sup>16</sup>) Leslie H. Palmer, *Suharto's Indonesia*, *Asian Affairs Journal of The Royal Central Asian Soian Society*, Vol. 57, Part III, London, October 1970. P.74; Ailsa Zainuddin, M.A., B.(ed), *A short History of Indonesia*, Australia, 1968, p. 225.

(<sup>17</sup>) Jan M. Pluveir, *Confrontations A Study in Indonesian politics*, Oxford University press, Kuala Lumpur, 1965, p.44

(<sup>18</sup>) C.L.M. Penders, Op.Cit., p.43.

(<sup>19</sup>) Nugroho Notosusanto and Ismail Salah , *The Coup Attempt of the September 30 Movement In Indonesia* , Pembimbing Masa Publishing , Jakarta , 1968 , P.112.

(<sup>20</sup>) C.L.M. Penders, Op.Cit., p.48.

(<sup>21</sup>) Cited in: Antonie C. A. Dake , The Sukarno File... , Op .Cit. , P.31.

(<sup>22</sup>) W. F. Wertheim , Indonesia Before And After the Untung Coup , Pacific Affairs ,Vol.39 ,Nos.1/2 ,1966 , P. 116.

(<sup>23</sup>) C.L.M. Penders, Op.Cit., p.50.

(<sup>24</sup>) Peter Polomka , Indonesia Since Sukarno , Penguin Publishing , Australia , 1971 , P.70.

(<sup>25</sup>) Howard Palfrey Jones, Op.Cit., P.121-128.

(<sup>26</sup>) Kammen Douglas and Siddharth Chander , A Toury of Duty : Changing Patterns of Military Politics in Indonesia , Cornell Modern Indonesia , New York , 2007, Pp.75-76.

(<sup>27</sup>) Kammen Douglas and Siddharth Chander , op. cit.,p79.

(<sup>28</sup>) Arya Ajisaka , Mengenal Pahawan Indonesia : Penuntun Belajar , Kawan Pustaka , Kuala Lumpur ,2004 , Pp. 978-980.

(<sup>29</sup>) J. R. E. Waddell, Op.Cit., P.248.

(<sup>30</sup>) Seri Buku Tempo , Njoto :Peniup Saksfon di Tengah Prahara , Kepustakaan Populer Gramedia , Jakarta , 2010 , Pp.4-20.

(<sup>31</sup>) J. R. E. Waddell, Op.Cit., P.249.

(<sup>32</sup>) C.L.M. Penders, Op.Cit., p.57.

(<sup>33</sup>) Howard Palfrey Jones, Op.Cit., P.135-141.

(<sup>34</sup>) C.L.M. Penders, Op.Cit., p.58.

(<sup>35</sup>) Antonie C. A. Dake , In the Spirt of the Red Banteng : Indonesia Communists Between Moscow and Peking , Second Edition , Aksara Karunia Publishing , Jakarta , 2002 , P.387.

(<sup>36</sup>) C.L.M. Penders, Op.Cit., p.62.

(<sup>37</sup>) Ailsa Zainuddin, M , Op.Cit., p. 231.

(<sup>38</sup>) Ibid,P. 233.

(<sup>39</sup>) Muven Jan , Indonesian Policy During the Period 1965-1967 , Routledge Publishing , New York ,1984 , P.113.

(<sup>40</sup>) J. R. E. Waddell, Op.Cit., P.261.

(<sup>41</sup>) Ailsa Zainuddin, M , Op.Cit., p. 235.

(<sup>42</sup>) Soerojo Soegiarso , Siap menabur Angin Akan Menua: G30 / PKI dan Pran Bung Karno , Anter Kata Penerbitan , Jakarta , 1989 , P.371.

(<sup>43</sup>) Ailsa Zainuddin, M , Op.Cit., p. 239.

(44 ) John Foster Dulles: An American politician and diplomat who worked for many years as an adviser on foreign political affairs in the Republican Party. He was appointed US Secretary of State during the era of President Eisenhower, that is, in the period between (1953-1959), and he was famous for his strong hostility to communism and the non-aligned policy that was received Wide support in Asia, Africa and Latin America, especially among the Arab peoples. He played a major role in establishing military alliances. See: Kifah Juma and Jar, the previous source, p. 141.

(<sup>45</sup>) Njono Trial , di 1966 (Perkar Njono) in : D .O .M .L .B , K .P . I , by: P. P.K , P.23.

<sup>(46)</sup> J. R. E. Waddell, Op.Cit., P.271.

<sup>(47)</sup> Foreign Minister Chen Yi's meeting with the Indonesian ambassador on the regional rebellions and Indonesia's request to purchase rice from us," March 2, 1958, CFMA,105-00366-02;Howard Palfrey Jones, Op.Cit., P.151-153.

<sup>(48)</sup> Rudi Hartono , Sjam Kamaruzamn : Lelaki Misterius dalam Sjarah Indonesia , Kepustakaan Populer gramedia , Jakarta ,2011 , P.376.

<sup>(49)</sup> Antonie C. A. Dake , The Sukarno File. , Op .Cit. , P. 27.

<sup>(50)</sup> C.L.M. Penders, Op.Cit., p.71.

<sup>(51)</sup> Confirmation of Presidential Approval of Use of U. S. funds to furnish military Assistance on a grant basis to Indonesia,Department of State, 22 Aug, 1958, D.O.S.A, Documents. CK2349046494.

<sup>(52)</sup> Ailsa Zainuddin, M , Op.Cit., p. 253.

<sup>(53)</sup> J. R. E. Waddell, Op.Cit., P.286; F.R.U.S, 1958-1960, Vol,XXII, Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between Between Secretary of State Dulles and Director of Central Intelligence Dulles, Washington, April 23, 1958, p.121.

<sup>(54)</sup> Confirmation of Presidential Approval of Use of U. S. funds to furnish military Assistance on a grant basis to Indonesia,Department of State, 22 Aug, 1958, D.O.S.A, Documents. CK2349046494.