The Correspondence Theory of Truth and its Fallacious Implications for Epistemology
Abstract
The paper is concerned with an analysis of the notion of the correspondence theory of truth. The study is conducted with a view to correcting the problem associated with the formulation of the said theory, which is responsible for the proliferation of the essence of truth through its different criteria and the emergence of fallacies and skepticism in epistemology. The study adopted content analysis as its method. It is the argument of the paper that, although the essence of truth is correspondence, its reformulation as theory is necessary. The study concludes by reformulating the concept of truth as the correspondence of a statement and its referent, in the face a definite experience, to a statement and its referent for such patterns of experience, set as a standard in the foundational linguistic permutations of ontology within any language.
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